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In Metaromanticism, Paul Hamilton aims to set forth a new romanticism. He 
seeks to find within romanticism an alternative to the self-sufficient ideology 
of internalization and compensatory idealization for which it has often been 
criticized. Hamilton's romanticism is primarily British romanticism, but his 
work will be of interest readers of these pages because his approach to British 
romantic writers is firmly grounded in German romantic theory and German 
philosophy. He looks often to Kant, Schlegel, and Benjamin, and he draws 
much of his theoretical perspective from a Habermasian model of negotiation 
and dialogue. But his book will interest readers more generally for its rethink-
ing of romanticism in the wake of the ideology critiques launched by decon-
struction and new historicism. That is, if romantic ideology requires critique, 
from where must it come? From someplace outside romanticism, from an his-
torical differential, or from a function within romanticism itself? 
The first question to address is what Hamilton means by metaromanticism. 
The term, as Hamilton uses it, should not suggest a distance from romanti-
cism, a language outside of romantic writing, nor a pretension to external ob-
jectivity. He means, rather - as the prefix might also suggest - a form of ro-
mantic writing that reflects on its underlying principles and ulterior questions. 
As he puts it, romantic writing „is often simultaneously a position paper on its 
own kind of significance" (1). In metaromantic moments, texts critique them-
selves and dramatize their dissatisfaction with the entrapment in which they 
find themselves. They resist the autonomy and self-sufficiency of their aes-
thetic. 
The contours of this new romanticism emerge through contrasts, as Hamil-
ton juxtaposes instances of bad romantic writing with metaromantic texts. He 
frames these alternatives in the first two chapters, which treat Schiller and 
Rousseau, respectively. It is perhaps not surprising that Schiller is given the 
dubious honor of embodying bad romanticism. Hamilton focuses on 
Schiller's aesthetics: ideas can be frilly expressed in aesthetic experience be-
fore they can be practically realized in life. The aesthetic is supposed to be a 
way station on the road to a better life; it should give way to the life it in-
spires. The danger, however, is that the aesthetic becomes an end in itself, 
that it actually defers the better life for the sake of imagining it. According to 
this recuperative logic, every real-life failure becomes a victory for the aes-
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thetic. Art's refiexivity and autonomy impede revolutionary ideas and remove 
them from any real chain of events. 
This kind of romanticism is ideological because it creates a self-
confirming system that precludes critique. Wordsworth and his use of sym-
bolism provide a second example. Through a reading of The Prelude, Hamil-
ton shows that the romantic discourse cannot fail because it can recuperate 
every loss as an eventual gain. He writes, „There are no epistemological de-
feats that cannot be translated into ironic successes; the collapse of represen-
tation becomes its effective supplement when it is reread as the symbol of 
what exceeds representation" (202). When the sublime overwhelms under-
standing, for example, such romanticism can reinterpret understanding's fail-
ure as the successful symbolic representation of something beyond the limits 
of understanding. Failure stops being failure; it becomes instead a new kind 
of success. 
Hamilton argues at the same time that not all romanticism is satisfied with 
being confined to this defensive and totalizing ideological structure. Metaro-
manticism names an alternative to the ideology implied by Schiller's aesthet-
ics and Wordsworth's symbols, and we find it in authors like Rousseau and 
Schlegel. Hamilton reads Rousseau as preoccupied with self-interpretation in 
that he tried to anticipate how posterity - his children - would receive and 
distort him. On this view, one finds in Rousseau a kind of writing that inten-
tionally subverts itself, even damages itself, and surrenders its authority to 
later readers. It is sometimes difficult to pinpoint exactly how this self-
subversion takes place. Hamilton moves quickly in the theoretical chapters 
and does not always work closely with his texts. The result is that some of the 
metaromantic operations he identifies - such as „dramatizing discontent" -
are left ambiguous. But he clearly finds in Rousseau something akin to Frie-
drich Schlegel's notion of irony - a writing that undercuts its own position of 
privilege and authority, shifting it to another reader and another discourse. 
In the book's middle section, Hamilton focuses his readings on a series of 
literary texts. He finds metaromanticism at work in various places, in Keats, 
for instance, whose poetry „critically undermines what its aesthetic ideology 
obliges it to say" (91), and in Shelley, whose The Triumph of Life demon-
strates its discontent with ideological constraints. Hamilton's readings attempt 
to redefine immanent critique - not as the imprisonment of criticism within a 
particular discourse but rather as „the transfer of authority from one discourse 
to another" (195). Basically, he concedes that romanticism evinces a conser-
vative ideological tendency - look at idealism, look at Schiller - and that this 
ideology has been „rightly attacked by a succession of thinkers, from Heine 
and Marx to contemporary new historicists" (214). Hamilton's point, though, 
is that there is also an alternative to this ideology within romanticism -
metaromanticism, which sets critique in motion and creates a space for future 
reformulations. 
When Hamilton takes up the possibility (or impossibility) of critiquing 
romantic ideology, when he refers to Heine, Marx, and contemporary new 
historicists, a clear reference point in the background is Jerome McGann, one 
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of the leading figures in shifting new historicist attention from renaissance 
studies to romanticism. McGann's The Romantic Ideology (1983) located a 
danger in romanticism. It saw romanticism as something to which contempo-
rary criticism could fall prey - at least one could fall prey to the illusion that 
the romantic past established the boundaries of current critical practice. For 
this reason, romanticism requires an oppositional historicism. One of 
McGann's key models is Heine's reading of Uhland in Die romantische 
Schule, a reading attuned to the historical distance separating 1833 from 1813 
(see McGann's chapter 5). For McGann, this 20-year gap and this outside 
agency are necessary preconditions to counteract the effects of Uhland's ro-
mantic ideology. But another position would be to argue that the subversion 
already occurs in the text itself. Schlegel would call it romantic irony, or to 
use Murray Krieger's words, it is the „verbal workings" that undo the ten-
dency toward totalization. Though Hamilton does not directly engage 
McGann's work on this particular topic, the reading of Heine and Uhland 
helps illustrate the possibility he sees in metaromanticism: he wants to fold 
the force of Heine's critical reading into romanticism itself; he wants to find 
an historicizing, self-distancing ideology critique within romantic discourse. 
From Hamilton's perspective, critique need not begin only from a later, out-
side position because even an immanent critique can express dissatisfaction 
with its immanence. Hamilton thus complicates McGann's understanding of 
romantic ideology and the agency of its critique. Even if romanticism looks 
like a totalizing discourse that leaves no place outside ideology from which it 
can be critiqued, the possibility always remains that it can undermine its own 
authority from within. The minimum threshold ofthat critique, for Hamilton, 
is that romantic texts express - or better, dramatize - a discontent with their 
imprisonment in immanence and thereby prepare a way for future critique. 
In the final section, „Theory," Hamilton turns more explicitly to issues of 
contemporary criticism, to the „afterlife of romantic theory which we inhabit" 
(193), and to the intersection of aesthetics and politics. Here Habermas comes 
to the fore through his notion of the „stand-in" or Platzhalter. In Moralbe-
wußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Habermas uses the term to suggest a 
more modest role for philosophy: it should serve as a Platzhalter rather than a 
Platzanweiser. It should act as a mediator or translator among the isolated 
cultures of science, morals, and art. For Hamilton, the „stand-in" presents an 
alternative to Schiller's aesthetics of infinite deferral. In contrast, the „stand-
in" is a communicative function that is pragmatic and productive. Rather than 
prefigure a deferred future ideal, it serves the present needs of compromise 
and negotiation. Hamilton connects Habermas in this regard to Schlegel's no-
tions of irony and permanent parabasis. Using Lyceums-Fragment Nr. 65, 
„Die Poesie ist eine republikanische Rede [...]" (misattributed as an Athe-
näums-Fragment), Hamilton finds in Schlegel a model for progressive, eman-
cipatory politics based on literary self-reflection and self-criticism. 
It is an ambitious and interesting project to develop a political model 
through Habermas and to link it to a metaromantic practice for which 
Schlegel provides theoretical support. As many readers have noted, Schlegel 
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exemplifies a writing that cedes authority, refuses to close itself, and thinks it-
self, from the outset, as fragmentary and self-distancing. At the same time, 
however, bringing together „Schegelian republicanism" (265) and Haber-
mas's theory of communicative action requires one to overlook much of 
Schlegel's skepticism about the efficacy of dialogue and communication. 
Schlegel sounds like less of a pragmatic optimist when he writes lines such as 
the oft-quoted, „Das Höchste kann man eben weil es unaussprechlich ist, nur 
allegorisch sagen" (KA 2, 324). In another example, Hamilton writes that 
„Schlegel has no time for Kant's careful sequestration of the aesthetic in a 
realm of its own" (262). But perhaps Schlegel is not in such a hurry. In Lyce-
ums-Fragment Nr. 117, which claims famously that „Poesie kann nur durch 
Poesie kritisiert werden", he speaks directly of the „Reiche der Kunst" (KA 2, 
162). Hamilton chooses fragments that support his take on Schlegel and omits 
others that suggest a more nuanced or even conflicted view - those, for in-
stance, that highlight Schlegel's fondness for obscurity and exclusivity. This 
criticism might be unfair, given that the book is not really about Schlegel and 
does not seek to give a comprehensive account of his thought. But the point is 
this: Schlegel becomes a necessary instrument in the argument when he con-
nects metaromantic writing to a more generalizable political and communica-
tive project. To fit Schlegel into this role, Hamilton smooths out some of the 
rough edges and inherent self-contradictions in Schlegel's writings. I suspect 
that many specialists in early German romanticism would not recognize this 
Schlegel at first sight and would want to complicate the presentation of him 
offered in this book. 
Metaromanticism received the International Conference on Romanticism's 
2003 Jean-Pierre Barricelli prize for the year's outstanding book. It is indeed 
a remarkable work that deserves praise for its wide-ranging argument, com-
paratist approach, and insightful readings. It brings together romantic texts, 
politics, and metacritical issues in a productive and mutually illuminating dia-
logue. Anyone interested in the scholarship and theory of romanticism (espe-
cially British romantic literature) after deconstruction and new historicism 
will profit from reading it. Since the linkage of German theory and British 
texts tends to generate more penetrating insights on the British side, German-
ists will probably turn to this book less for its readings of particular authors 
than for its broad claims about the relationship of romantic thought to current 
critical, ideological, and sociopolitical debates. 
